From the appellant’s brief in a criminal matter:
Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the prosecution discharged its affirmative burden of establishing that the appellant’s confession was not the product of his illegal arrest and detention and, therefore, was admissible against him, by concluding that the act of police interrogators in confronting the appellant with the inculpatory admissions of an alleged co-defendant prior to eliciting appellant’s confession, constituted an adequate “intervening event” which supposedly broke the causal chain between his illegal arrest and detention rendering his confession “a product of a free will,” notwithstanding the fact, that the record irrefutably demonstrates that the appellant was arrested illegally, without the benefit of a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, in violation of Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was thereafter interrogated while illegally detained, was, at all times during his 22 hours at the homicide division, in the presence and under the control of the police, was never taken to a magistrate, never spoke with a lawyer and was mislead by the interrogators about what he was actually being charged with?
A single sentence of 179 words. We can do better than that, can’t we?
Smith was under police control at the station for 22 hours. Police never took him before a magistrate or let him speak with a lawyer, and they misled him about the charge against him. They then arrested him without a warrant—which the prosecution admits was illegal. But the prosecution asserts that when the police confronted Smith with inculpatory admissions of an alleged co-defendant, that intervening event broke the causal chain between his illegal arrest and his confession.
- Was the court of appeals correct that the prosecution carried its burden of proving this break in the causal chain, rendering Smith’s confession a product of his free will?
I gave it a shot. Thoughts?