Apr

18

Discussion of Free Will

April 18, 2013 | by olh225 | | Leave a Comment

For this week’s UPA meeting we will read “Are We Free to Break the Laws?” by David Lewis. We hope that you’ll join us on Friday at 4:45pm in Garrison 0.132 for a great discussion!

Abstract:
 

Lewis defends soft determinism against the criticism that it posits a marvelous ability to break the laws of nature. Soft determinism is a variety of compatibilism which claims that determinism is true, and that some predetermined acts are done freely. If determinism is true, then there is a true conjunctive proposition, H & L (where H expresses a state of affairs in the world at a time prior to a particular act, and L expresses the laws of nature), such that the conjunction of H & L implies a proposition expressing the performance of a particular act and contradicts its negation. According to soft determinism, acts are done freely insofar as one is able to act contrary to what is predetermined. If such a contrary act is done, then either a contradiction would be true, the proposition H would be false, or the proposition L would be false. Both the first and second alternatives must be dismissed, so, the consequence of soft determinism is that L is falsifiable. Lewis distinguishes between a weak and strong version of this consequence. The former states: “I am able to do something such that, if I did, a law would be broken”, and the latter: “I am able to break a law.” Lewis argues that the weak version is the genuine consequence of soft determinism, while the strong version is imposed on the view by its incompatibilist critics. According to Lewis, it is just the case that a law must have been broken had one acted contrary to what was predetermined. L is not rendered false by an act, but L must be otherwise falsified if the act is done.

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar
Undergraduate Philosophy Association Co-Presidents

Apr

11

Consequentialize This

April 11, 2013 | by jrs4862 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA!

This week we will read a thought provoking paper by Campbell Brown, titled “Consequentialize This”. As always, this Friday’s discussion will be in Garrison 0.132 at 4:45 PM. Here’s a summary of the paper:

Consequentialism is a class of moral theories that have, as their common element, the contention that the right thing to do is that thing which maximizes the good. To consequentialize a moral theory is to claim that it is a form of consequentialism. This is usually done by tailoring a theory of the good in an appropriate way. For example, suppose that a moral theory is said to conflict with consequentialism because it puts a premium on rights. The supporter of the putatively nonconsequentialist theory will construct an example where violating a person’s rights would produce the most good, but where violating the rights seems, intuitively, to be the wrong thing to do. The consequentialist, in this case, can just build rights into her theory of the good, and voila, the supposedly nonconsequentialist is, by her lights, a consequentialist. It has been suggested by some that every theory can be consequentialized. Brown claims that this is not so. He gives a formally precise definition of consequentialism, which is rigorously proved to be equivalent to three conditions he calls Agent Neutrality, No Moral Dilemmas, and Dominance. Since the consequentialist has to endorse these, Brown claims, there are moral theories that cannot be consequentialized: Namely, those that violate these three conditions. This is not necessarily a bad thing for consequentialists; In fact, it shows that consequentialism is a substantive theory since it is not compatible with all moral theories.

See you this Friday!

Olivia and Josh

Apr

4

The Easy and Hard Problems of Consciousness

April 4, 2013 | by olh225 | | 1 Comment

Hello UPA!

It was great to see so many of you at last Friday’s graduate student presentation! We’d like to thank Derek Anderson for kindly sharing his work and time with UPA. The presentation was very insightful, and followed by good questions and good discussion.

At this week’s UPA meeting, we will discuss “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” by David J. Chalmers. As always, Friday’s discussion will be held in Garrison 0.132 at 4:45pm!

Here is the article abstract:

Chalmers divides the challenges faced by a theory of consciousness into “easy” and “hard” problems. Easy problems concern those mental phenomena, such as the integration of information or the reportablility of mental states, that are functionally definable – a physical theory of consciousness may wholly explain these cognitive functions in terms of neural mechanisms. Although the reductive method of cognitive science and neuroscience offers the promise of eventually solving the easy problems of consciousness, Chalmers argues that a purely physical theory is unequipped to face the hard problems of consciousness – how and why the performance of cognitive functions is accompanied by experience. There is a subjectivity to experience, consisting in mental phenomena such as the felt qualities of color and emotion, or the sensation of pain. Reductive methods systematically fail to bridge the explanatory gap between experience and the physical, because, Chalmers insists, the subjectivity of experience is not a problem concerning the performance of functions. Chalmers argues that the natural alternative approach to this hard problem is a nonreductive explanation of experience. He proposes a theory of consciousness - naturalistic dualism -which posits experience as a fundamental feature of the world, and bases its account of experience on the principles of structural coherence and organizational invariance, and a double-aspect theory of information.

See you on Friday!

Sincerely,

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

Undergraduate Philosophy Association Co-Presidents

Mar

28

X-Phi and its discontents

March 28, 2013 | by jrs4862 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA!

This Friday, UT grad student Derek Anderson will be giving his talk “Can Experimental Philosophy Refute Armchair Philosophers?” Come join us in Garrison 0.132 at 4:45. There is no paper to read this week, and Derek’s abstract can be found below:

“Experimental philosophy is in the business of providing experimental evidence about the intuitions of populations. I am interested in whether this kind of data can be used to refute a philosophical theory constructed from the armchair. I consider four plausible ways it might be thought to do so and argue that, in each case, data about common intuitions can’t give us a reason to abandon an armchair theory. Each of my defenses of the armchair method requires accepting a substantive philosophical claim, so it seems that immunity to experimental refutation comes with substantive philosophical commitments, which any philosopher who willfully ignores this kind of experimental data should be aware of.”

Hope to see you Friday!

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar
UPA Co-Presidents

Mar

20

Moral Philosophy at UPA

March 20, 2013 | by olh225 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA!

Hopefully everyone enjoyed a great week off! Due to low member turnout the Friday before spring break, we decided to postpone the reading selection for that meeting until this Friday. So, this week we will discuss “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” an article by Phillipa Foot in which she challenges the contention that all moral judgments are what Kant referred to as “categorical imperatives.” Join us for discussion on Friday, March 22th at 4:45 in Garrison 0.132! 
 
Abstract:
 
Hypothetical imperatives are judgments to the effect that one should perform some action on the basis of some end one wishes to achieve; for example, “If you wish to have strong bones, you ought to eat calcium-rich foods.” Kant famously held that morality had to be a system of categorical imperatives.  Categorical imperatives are judgments that one should do something regardless of the ends they want to achieve, e.g. “You ought to give money to charity.”  Foot denies that moral judgments are categorical imperatives.  For one, if the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives was simply that when stating a categorical imperative we don’t mention the interests of an agent, then the dictates of etiquette would count as categorical imperatives– Take an imperative such as “You ought to use the salad fork for salad,” for example. This is something that Kant would have been at pains to deny. So there must be some other sense in which moral judgments are held to be categorical and rules of etiquette hypothetical.  Some have claimed that moral considerations have “automatic” reason giving force in a way that rules of etiquette don’t.  However, this thesis must be argued for. Foot claims that there is no argument that establishes this thesis, so we should accept that moral judgments are hypothetical. Some might worry that this undermines morality; Foot does not think so, claiming that agents can, and often do, adopt non-selfish ends, so even if an agent thinks of moral judgments hypothetically, she can still be a moral agent.

 

Hope to see you this Friday!

Best Regards,

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

UPA Co-Presidents

Mar

6

The categorical imperative and its disKANTents

March 6, 2013 | by jrs4862 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA!

This week we will be discussing an article called “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” in which Phillipa Foot challenges the contention that all moral judgments are what Kant referred to as “categorical imperatives.”  We will be meeting at 4:45 in Garrison 0.132 on Friday, March 8th. 
Abstract:
 
Hypothetical imperatives are judgments to the effect that one should perform some action on the basis of some end she wishes to achieve; for example, “If you wish to have strong bones, you ought to eat calcium-rich foods.” Kant famously held that morality had to be a system of categorical imperatives.  Categorical imperatives are judgments that one should do something regardless of the ends they want to achieve, e.g. “You ought to give money to charity.”  Foot denies that moral judgments are categorical imperatives.  For one, if the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives was simply that when stating a categorical imperative we don’t mention the interests of an agent, then the dictates of etiquette would count as categorical imperatives– Take an imperative such as “You ought to use the salad fork for salad,” for example.This is something that Kant would have been at pains to deny. So there must be some other sense in which moral judgments are held to be categorical and rules of etiquette hypothetical.  Some have claimed that moral considerations have “automatic” reason giving force in a way that rules of etiquette don’t.  However, this thesis must be argued for. Foot claims that there is no argument that establishes this thesis, so we should accept that moral judgments are hypothetical. Some might worry that this undermines morality; Foot does not think so, claiming that agents can, and often do, adopt non-selfish ends, so even if an agent thinks of moral judgments hypothetically, she can still be a moral agent.
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Hope to see you this Friday, and if not, have a fun break!
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Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar
UPA Co-Presidents

Feb

27

Classical Indian Philosophy at UPA

February 27, 2013 | by jrs4862 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA!

 

This week, UT graduate student Malcolm Keating will be giving a talk called “Access to Non-Literal Meaning in Indian Philosophy: Or, Why We’re Not All Amelia Bedelia,” on topics at an intersection between philosophy of language, linguistics, and the exegesis of classical Indian philosophy.  He has kindly provided us with an abstract, which can be found below.  The talk will be held in Garrison 0.132 at 4:45 on Friday, March 1st.

 

“My talk focuses on the question, “How do hearers know when to interpret an utterance as being non-literal?” One puzzling feature of language use is that hearers know to interpret an utterance as non-literal even in instances where there’s nothing “wrong” with the sentence itself.  I will introduce some of the resources employed by classical Indian philosophy to explain this phenomenon. In particular, I focus on a thinker named Mukula Bhatta. His answer was that incompatibilities between the sentence and its context trigger a search for an interpretation that would resolve them. I show how his answer is an improvement on an earlier view in Indian philosophy.”

 

We have not attached a pdf file this week since there is no paper to read; just bring your philosophy-ready brains.

 

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

UPA Co-Presidents

Feb

21

“Judicial Discretion” by Ronald Dworkin

February 21, 2013 | by olh225 | | 1 Comment

Dear UPA,

As always, we hope that we find you well. Some of you may have heard that Ronald Dworkin passed away this past week. For his contributions in philosophy of law and legal theory, Ronald Dworkin is considered by many to be one of the most important and influential legal scholars of our time. In respect for his memory, we have selected “Judicial Discretion”, a paper that he presented at a Philosophy of Law symposium in 1963, for this week’s discussion. We hope that you will join us this Friday at 4:45pm in Garrison Hall room 0.132.

Abstract:

Dworkin identifies a tension between public and academic opinion regarding judicial behavior. According to Dworkin, the layman’s respect for law proceeds from the belief that judges resolve legal controversy by applying the law (i.e. statutes, established legal principles, common law, etc.) to particular cases without indulging private prejudices – in short, judges “find” law and they do not “make” law themselves. In contrast, academic opinion insists that, in at least some cases, judges choose a solution, rather than find one prescribed by law. These “hard cases”, in which the rules of law and their application do not seem to yield a determinate result, indicate that discretion plays a substantive role in judicial decisions. In response, Dworkin insists that genuine discretion entitles the individual to choose any decision that he prefers, and disentitles any relevant party from demanding a particular decision of him. Discretion is exercised when decisions are made, and justified, by means that exclude the application of public standards. Dworkin notes that the academic opinion rests on the claim that the rules of law are the only true standards for judicial reasoning, and that a judicial decision that appeals to other standards constitutes the exercise of discretion. However, that a judge decides a “hard case” by standards other than the rules of law, does not show that he is exercising discretion – he is never free to make a decision according to his personal preferences as his decision is always constrained by public standards for good judicial reasoning. Given these considerations, Dworkin claims that the layman’s opinion, rather than the academic opinion, is a more accurate (albeit simplistic) view of adjudication, and that the term “judicial discretion” misconceives what is properly understood as the judicial obligation to adjudicate according to public standards for good judicial reasoning.

We look forward to seeing you on Friday!

Best Regards,

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

Undergraduate Philosophy Association Co-Presidents

Feb

13

UPA Hosts Graduate Student Speaker Fatema Amijee

February 13, 2013 | by olh225 | | 2 Comments

Philosophy Students and Friends,

This week the Undergraduate Philosophy Association has the good fortune of hosting Fatema Amijee, one of UT’s own philosophy graduate students! Fatema will present her paper “Why Identity is not a Relation” and she has kindly provided us with an abstract. There is no reading for this week’s meeting, so we invite you to simply come, learn, and ask questions! As always, we will meet on Friday at 4:45pm in Garrison room 0.132.

Abstract:

“We learn in our introductory logic classes that identity is a two-place or dyadic relation. It is symmetric, transitive, and reflexive: all properties of relations. Metaphysicians project this relational talk into their ontology. Faced with the relational properties of ‘=’, we are told that identity is a genuine relation between objects. I reject this ontological dogma: identity is not a dyadic relation.

The claim that identity is not a dyadic relation can take one of two forms. It is either a reductionist thesis that holds that the putative dyadic relation of identity can be reduced to more fundamental non-relational or monadic properties, or an eliminativist thesis that holds that there is no relation of identity. I argue for the latter thesis: the claim that there is no genuine relation of identity.”

See you on Friday!

Best Regards,

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

Undergraduate Philosophy Association Co-Presidents

Feb

6

“Which Emotions are Basic?” by Jesse Prinz

February 6, 2013 | by jrs4862 | | Leave a Comment

Hello UPA,

We hope that you are having a pleasant week.  This week we will discuss Jesse Prinz’s 2004 paper “Which Emotions are Basic?”  As always, we will be meeting in Garrison 0.132 at 4:45 on Friday.

 The content of this paper is, to a significant extent, psychological rather than purely philosophical.  However, due to the foundational nature of the issues being discussed and the unorthodox conclusion offered, this paper can motivate philosophical discussion of theoretical parsimony and how we conceptualize the basic constituents of our mental lives.

Abstract:

On one view, emotions are evolutionary adaptations.  Another view is that emotions are socially constructed.  There are hybrid theories according to which there is a set of emotions that has been shaped by natural selection, but that many of the emotions that we talk about are socially constructed. Prinz argues that none of these theories is really adequate.  Many of the evolutionary explanations given for emotions held to be basic (such as love) seem to be informed by the cultural biases of researchers.  On the other hand social constructionists hold that certain emotions can be disembodied—That is, that there is no regular pattern of physiological activity that goes along with certain emotions, such as guilt.  But neuroscientists have seen that particular parts of the brain tend to activate when experimental subjects recall episodes of guilt.  Furthermore, social constructionists overemphasize the role of cognition in emotion. That leaves us with the hybrid theories.  Prinz claims that the similarity that we see between emotions gives us reason to reject these theories.

Prinz’s positive proposal is that the truly basic emotions are physiological and that we have no names for them.  The basic emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. However, what elicits the basic emotions is culturally informed. In Prinz’s words: “Each (named emotion) is built up from a biologically basic emotion, but its conditions of elicitation, and hence its content, is influenced by learning.”

Best,

Olivia Hursh and Josh Sklar

UPA Co-Presidents